江泽民 (Jiang Zemin), ch PRC sub 361
Today I learned (TIL)
Jiang Zemin (江泽民) passing (2022-11-30)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jiang_Zemin
Jiang Zemin (江泽民)[a] (17 August 1926 – 30 November 2022)
Jiang Zemin (江泽民)[a] (17 August 1926 – 30 November 2022) was a Chinese politician who served as general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) from 1989 to 2002, as chairman of the Central Military Commission from 1989 to 2004, and as president of China from 1993 to 2003. Jiang represented the "core of the third generation" of CCP leaders since 1989.
Jiang came to power unexpectedly as a compromise candidate following the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, when he replaced Zhao Ziyang as CCP general secretary after Zhao was ousted for his support for the student movement. As the involvement of the "Eight Elders" in Chinese politics steadily declined,[1] Jiang consolidated his hold on power to become the "paramount leader" in the country during the 1990s.[b] Urged by Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, Jiang officially introduced the term "socialist market economy" in his speech during the 14th CCP National Congress held later that year, which accelerate "opening up and reform".[2]
Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China
https://mod.gov.cn/
eng.mod.gov.cn
the certificate to the https has expired (?)
https://mod.gov.cn/lib/index.htm
no https for the English version
eng.mod.gov.cn
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/node_48461.htm
(sorry we only have the English language version)
https://www.defense.gov/
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learn Chinese mandarin through song
https://youtu.be/tc2tW0jFHPo
this song comes with prounuciation guide in English
Chinese
and English translation
learn English through song (for Chinese) ??
???
looking for song with English pronunciation guide
English
with Chinese translation
???
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ebSUtMoYPw
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CULTURE
The Song That Sold America to a Generation of Asian Immigrants
John Denver’s “Take Me Home, Country Roads” had an unlikely resonance across Asia 50 years ago. Today his ode to West Virginia conjures a different type of longing.
By Jason Jeong
MAY 4, 2021
But over the past half century, Denver’s Appalachian anthem has also lodged in the hearts of many families in Asia, thousands of miles away from the Blue Ridge Mountains. In a 2009 paper, the sociologists Grant Blank and Heidi Netz Rupke published an informal survey of college classrooms in Western China that found that “Country Roads” was the most popular American song among the students. Although the survey’s sample was small, its findings were, as Blank and Rupke write, a testament to the song’s enduring relevance as a “powerful cultural symbol.”
... ... ...
While Denver mania spread across China, the artist was seen as a deliberate tool for U.S. cultural influence in other parts of the continent. Karen Tongson, a professor of American studies and ethnicity at the University of Southern California and the author of Why Karen Carpenter Matters, told me that the music of soft-rock artists such as Denver and Karen Carpenter gained massive followings because of the availability of Armed Forces Radio (now called the American Forces Network) over decades in regions with a significant U.S. army presence, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Korea. The music that was played over military airwaves had to be muted in its subject and in its politics—think of how Robin Williams’s character in Good Morning, Vietnam would repeatedly find himself in trouble for playing rock and “that funky music” as a DJ for the U.S. military in Saigon.
... ... ...
Once an anthem for the possibilities of Americana, “Country Roads” half a century later might resonate with the Asian diaspora in a different way: as a melancholic reminder of leaving a place they called home, and everything lost to the promise of a better life. While it used to be a blank canvas for the hope of their youth, the song’s emotional resonance has evolved as many Asian people’s illusion of America has dissolved: There was no Denver hit called “Go Back Home (Where You Belong)” or Eagles track called “Lyin’ Slanty Eyes.” For my parents and their cohort, immigration’s emotional cost is enumerated by the weddings of new family they couldn’t meet, birthdays of friends they couldn’t celebrate, and funerals of loved ones to whom they couldn’t say goodbye. To a generation that has experienced the fallacies of the American dream, “Country Roads” might still feel like a song of longing—though less for an aspirational, imagined home than for one where they know they’ll belong.
https://www.theatlantic.com/culture/archive/2021/05/what-john-denver-means-some-asian-immigrants/618784/
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Today I learned (TIL)
PRC submarine lost at sea in 2003
the entire crew was lost (died) from ...
the submarine was christened the Great Wall #61 (长城61号)
a conventional diesel/electric submarine
according to en.wikipedia.org entry
Fatal incident
According to the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, all 70 crew members died when the submarine's diesel engine used up all available oxygen (because it had failed to shut down properly) while the boat was submerged on April 16, 2003. The submarine, which was commanded by Commodore Cheng Fuming (程福明), had been taking part in naval exercises east of Inner Changshan Islands in the Yellow Sea off the coast of Northeastern China. Along with its normal complement, the crew included 13 trainee cadets from the Chinese naval academy.[5]
After the disaster, the crippled submarine drifted for ten days because it was on a silent, no-contact exercise. The boat was discovered by Chinese fishermen who noticed its periscope sticking above the surface on April 25, 2003. The crew were slumped over at their stations, seemingly having died before becoming aware of any issue.[6]
source:
why don't we run out of oxygen?
https://www.quora.com/Why-dont-we-run-out-of-oxygen?share=1
John Jones
Former STS1(SS) at US Navy Submarine Force (1979–1988)Author has 344 answers and 3.6M answer views3y
Related
How do you run out of oxygen on a submarine?
The Chinese are the only ones to do it in the modern era that we know of. In 2003, a Ming III class DE Submarine lost its entire crew when a diesel failed to shut down correctly, and the crew had all hatches and the snorkel mast down before verifying the diesel was secured. Only the periscope was up.
The diesel sucked all the oxygen from the pressure hull, killing the crew so fast they were all found at their watchstations. It drifted for 10 days, until its Periscope washttps://www.quora.com/Why-dont-we-run-out-of-oxygen?seen by fisherman and reported to the Chinese military.
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https://www.reddit.com/r/todayilearned/comments/wsl7ev/til_about_the_ming_iii_class_submarine_great_wall/
Posted by3 months ago
TIL about the Ming III class submarine "Great Wall #61" found adrift by fishermen in 2003. All 70 crew members died when the submarine's diesel engine used up all available oxygen. The crew were slumped over at their stations, seemingly having died before becoming aware of any issue.
seamustheseagull
·
3 mo. ago
Reminds me of that incident with the private jet which was flying perfectly fine and level but couldn't be contacted on any channel
They sent up a jet to see if they could do something and the saw the crew completely passed out in the cockpit.
Nothing could be done, it just kept on flying on autopilot for several hours until it eventually ran out of fuel and crashed.
The generally accepted theory is that there was a sudden loss of cabin pressure which took everyone out.
·
3 mo. ago
All-Seeing Upvote
Helios 522. Didn't lose pressure, crew dun goofed and never set the pressurisation system to function. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Airways_Flight_522 not everyone was asleep, two cabin crew tried to save the plane using portable oxygen but it were too late.
level 1
txtbasedjesus
·
3 mo. ago
The really scary thing about this is that, unless a sensor was going off, nobody would have felt the drop in oxygen. A build up of CO2 in our blood is what causes us to panic and gasp for air but if there's just no oxygen, they wouldn't have even known. Just sitting there working and then they'd pass out and die.
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Chinese submarine 361
Ming class SS.svg
History
China
Name No. 361
General characteristics
Class and type Ming-class submarine
Displacement
1,584 tonnes (1,559 long tons) surfaced
2,113 tonnes (2,080 long tons) submerged
Length 76 m (249 ft 4 in)
Beam 7.6 m (24 ft 11 in)
Draft 5.1 m (16 ft 9 in)
Propulsion
2 × Shaanxi 6E 390 ZC1 diesels rated at 5,200 hp (3.82 MW)
2 × Xiangtan alternators
2 shafts
Speed
15 knots (28 km/h; 17 mph) surfaced
18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph) submerged
Complement 55 (9 officers)
Armament
6 × bow torpedo tubes
2 × stern torpedo tubes
The submarine hull number No. 361 named Great Wall #61 (长城61号)[1] was a Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy Type 035AIP (ES5E variant) (NATO reporting name Ming III) conventional diesel/electric submarine. In April 2003, during a military exercise in the Yellow Sea between North Korea and China's Shandong Province, the vessel suffered a mechanical failure that killed all 70 crew members on board.[2][3] It was one of China's worst peacetime military disasters. The PLA Navy's Commander Shi Yunsheng and Political Commissar Yang Huaiqing were both dismissed as a result of the accident.[2]
Background
Main article: Type 035 submarine
No. 361 was part of the 12th Brigade of the North Sea Fleet of the PLAN based at Lüshunkou in Liaoning Province. It was a Type 035AIP (Ming-class) submarine.[citation needed]
According to CNN, China was increasing training and exercises of its submarines in the east to carry out a policy of "sea denial" to counter the United States Pacific Fleet.[4]
Fatal incident
According to the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, all 70 crew members died when the submarine's diesel engine used up all available oxygen (because it had failed to shut down properly) while the boat was submerged on April 16, 2003. The submarine, which was commanded by Commodore Cheng Fuming (程福明), had been taking part in naval exercises east of Inner Changshan Islands in the Yellow Sea off the coast of Northeastern China. Along with its normal complement, the crew included 13 trainee cadets from the Chinese naval academy.[5]
After the disaster, the crippled submarine drifted for ten days because it was on a silent, no-contact exercise. The boat was discovered by Chinese fishermen who noticed its periscope sticking above the surface on April 25, 2003. The crew were slumped over at their stations, seemingly having died before becoming aware of any issue.[6]
At a press conference on May 8, 2003, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue stated that while on an exercise east of Changshan Islands, the No. 361 submarine was incapacitated by a mechanical problem and all 70 on board had perished. The submarine had been towed to a port as of the time of the press conference.[7] The submarine was initially towed to Yulin Harbor near Sanya on Hainan Island before being taken back to the northeast seaport of Dalian in Liaoning province.
Aftermath
May 2, 2003, Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman Jiang Zemin said in a condolence message to the families of the dead
CMC Vice-chairman Guo Boxiong led an enquiry into the incident, which resulted in the dismissal or demotion of five senior PLA Navy officers in June 2003: Navy Commander Shi Yunsheng (replaced by Zhang Dingfa) and Political Commissar Yang Huaiqing; North Sea Fleet Commander Ding Yiping, Political Commissar Chen Xianfeng (陈先锋), and Chief of Staff Xiao Xinnian.[2] Ding Yiping had been groomed to be the candidate for Navy Commander, but was removed from contention after the accident. Admiral Wu Shengli eventually succeeded Zhang Dingfa as Commander.[3]
source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_submarine_361
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EAST ASIA
Chinese Military's Secret to Success: European Engineering
December 19, 2013 5:11 PM
Reuters
In this photo taken on July 17, 2013 and released by the Chinese Navy Oct 27, 2013, sailors in protective gear clean and disinfect a nuclear submarine during a drill at the Qingdao submarine base in east China's Shandong province.
In this photo taken on July 17, 2013 and released by the Chinese Navy Oct 27, 2013, sailors in protective gear clean and disinfect a nuclear submarine during a drill at the Qingdao submarine base in east China's Shandong province.
HONG KONG — If the People's Liberation Army went to war tomorrow, it would field an arsenal bristling with hardware from some of America's closest allies: Germany, France and Britain.
Most of China's advanced surface warships are powered by German and French-designed diesel engines. Chinese destroyers have French sonar, anti-submarine-warfare helicopters and surface-to-air missiles.
Above the battlefield, British jet engines drive PLA fighter bombers and anti-ship strike aircraft. The latest Chinese surveillance aircraft are fitted with British airborne early warning radars. Some of China's best attack and transport helicopters rely on designs from Eurocopter, a subsidiary of pan-European aerospace and defense giant EADS.
But perhaps the most strategic item obtained by China on its European shopping spree is below the waterline: the German-engineered diesels inside its submarines.
Emulating the rising powers of last century - Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union - China is building a powerful submarine fleet, including domestically built Song and Yuan-class boats. The beating hearts of these subs are state-of-the-art diesel engines designed by MTU Friedrichshafen GmbH of Friedrichshafen, Germany. Alongside 12 advanced Kilo-class submarines imported from Russia, these 21 German-powered boats are the workhorses of China's modern conventional submarine force.
With Beijing flexing its muscles around disputed territory in the East China Sea and South China Sea, China's diesel-electric submarines are potentially the PLA's most serious threat to its American and Japanese rivals. This deadly capability has been built around robust and reliable engine technology from Germany, a core member of the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Arms trade data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) to the end of 2012 shows that 56 MTU-designed diesels for submarines have been supplied to the Chinese navy.
“They are the world's leading submarine diesel engines,” says veteran engineer Hans Ohff, former managing director of the Australian Submarine Corporation, the company that built Australia's Collins-class conventional submarines.
MTU declined to answer questions about transfers to the Chinese navy, future deliveries or whether it supplies technical support or servicing. “All MTU exports strictly follow German export laws,” a company spokesman said.
China's military market
The Chinese defense ministry says the PLA's dependence on foreign arms technology is overstated. “According to international practice, China is also engaged in communication and cooperation with some countries in the area of weaponry development,” the ministry said in a statement responding to this series. “Some people have politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign countries, smearing our reputation.”
Transfers of European technology to the Chinese military are documented in SIPRI data, official EU arms trade figures and technical specifications reported in Chinese military publications.
These transfers are crucial for the PLA as it builds the firepower to enforce Beijing's claims over disputed maritime territory and challenge the naval dominance of the U.S. and its allies in Asia.
China now has the world's second-largest defense budget after the United States and the fastest growing military market. Many of Europe's biggest defense contractors have been unable to resist its allure. High-performance diesels from MTU and French engine maker Pielstick also drive many of China's most advanced surface warships and support vessels, SIPRI data shows. Pielstick was jointly owned by MTU and German multinational Man Diesel & Turbo until 2006, when Man took full control.
Some military analysts remain skeptical about the quality of China's military hardware. They say the engines and technology the PLA is incorporating from Europe and Russia fall short of the latest equipment in service with the United States and its allies in Asia, including Japan, South Korea and Australia. This leaves the PLA a generation behind and struggling to integrate gear from a range of different suppliers, they say.
Others counter that China doesn't need to match all of the most complex weapons fielded by the United States and its allies. Even if it deploys less than the best gear, Beijing can achieve its strategic goal of blunting U.S. power.
“At what point do they become good enough?” says Kevin Pollpeter, a specialist on Chinese military innovation at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at San Diego. “If they have sufficient quantities of good-enough weapons systems, maybe that will carry the day.”
Limits of embargo
Russia remains China's most important outside source of arms and technical assistance. The Chinese navy's best-known vessel - its sole aircraft carrier, the Liaoning - was purchased from Ukraine. A U.S. Navy vessel nearly collided with a Chinese warship last week while maneuvering near the Liaoning, during a time of heightened tensions over Beijing's recent declaration of a new air-defense zone in the East China Sea.
European hardware and know-how fills critical gaps, however. It wasn't supposed to play out this way.
The European Union has had an official embargo on arms shipments to China since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. Washington imposes even tighter restrictions on transfers of U.S. military technology to China, inspiring energetic efforts by Beijing to smuggle American gear and know-how. Europe's embargo, however, has been far more loosely interpreted and enforced. Thus weapons and, perhaps more importantly for the PLA, dual-use technology have steadily flowed from America's European allies to China.
EU arms makers have been granted licenses to export weapons worth almost 3 billion euros ($4.1 billion) to China in the 10 years to 2011, according to official figures from Brussels collated by the London-based Campaign Against Arms Trade. EU governments approved the sale of aircraft, warships, imaging equipment, tanks, chemical agents and ammunition, according to official figures.
Michael Mann, an EU spokesman in Brussels, said the EU arms embargo issued in June 1989 “does not refer to dual use goods.” It is up to individual member states to exercise control over such goods, Mann said.
From China's perspective, France and the UK interpret the arms embargo most generously, mostly blocking only lethal items or complete weapons systems. France was by far the biggest EU supplier, accounting for almost 2 billion euros of these licenses. The United Kingdom ranked second with almost 600 million euros, followed by Italy with 161 million euros. The value of weapons actually shipped is difficult to extract from the data because some countries, including the UK and Germany, don't report these figures.
The value of German export licenses for weapons was a relatively modest 32 million euros in the decade to 2011. However, EU arms trade figures don't include dual-use technology that in many cases can be sold without licenses. Examples of such technology include many kinds of diesel engines. The same applies to transfers of commercial aerospace design software that can be used for fighters, bombers and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Arms industry experts say dual-use transfers are almost certainly more valuable to the PLA than the actual weapons Europe has delivered. But it's impossible to calculate a hard number for European-Chinese trade: The EU lacks a consistent system for tracking these transfers amid the vast flow of goods, services and intellectual property to China. Europe shipped goods worth 143.9 billion euros to China in 2012, according to EU trade statistics.
Critics of the EU's arms trade with China say member states have failed to devise a system to enforce the embargo. They say this reflects the loose structure of the EU, where each member state interprets the restrictions differently according to domestic law, regulations and trade policies.
Geography plays a role, too: The distance between Europe and Asia means there is ambivalence about the rapid growth of Chinese military power. From Europe, China looks like an opportunity, not a threat.
Selling components
The embargo is nevertheless an embarrassment for Beijing; senior Chinese officials routinely call for it to be lifted, and pressure from Washington keeps it in place. That means the sale of complete weapons like the pan-European Eurofighter, German submarines or Spanish aircraft carriers remain impossible for the foreseeable future.
In the meantime, Europe has discovered a lucrative trade selling components, particularly if they incorporate dual-use technologies that fall outside the embargo.
“Nobody sells entire weapons systems,” says Otfried Nassauer, director of the Berlin Information Center for Transatlantic Security and an expert on Germany's arms trade. “But components, especially pricey high tech components, that works OK.”
Under Beijing's long-term policies to promote innovation, domestic arms makers are encouraged to import the foreign technology that China lacks. The challenge is to adapt this range of components and know-how into locally built weapons.
One example is how German engine makers have contributed technology to support China's expanding fleet of support vessels that monitor satellites and missiles.
Man Diesel & Turbo last year announced it would supply engines built under license in China for two new transport vessels for the China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Controlling Department, part of the PLA's General Armament Department (GAD). The GAD oversees weapons research and development and manages all of China's military and civilian space operations, including the tracking of satellites and missiles. The European engine maker will also supply gear boxes, propellers and propulsion control systems for the ships from its Danish manufacturing unit, it said.
A spokesman for Man Diesel & Turbo said about 250 of its engines had been made under license in China and supplied to the Chinese navy. The company also provided some selected services and spare parts including fuel equipment.
“All our business does fully comply with the applicable export control or embargo regulations set by Germany and the European Union,” the spokesman said. He added that Pielstick brand engines supplied to the PLA navy by Chinese licensees were not subject to export approval. “None of these engines is specifically designed for military purposes,” he said. “There is a broad variety of civil applications for these engines, too.”
Underwater disaster
Reliable submarine engines top Beijing's shopping list, and China's navy has good reason to want the best.
In the late spring of 2003, a disabled Chinese submarine was found drifting, partly submerged, in the Bohai Sea off China's northern coast. When the boat was raised, rescuers found all 70 of its crew dead. Their deaths were blamed on “mechanical difficulties,” according to reports at the time in China's state-controlled media. The outcome of any inquiry was never made public.
Since then, submariners all over the world have speculated about what went wrong aboard Ming class submarine number 361, a Chinese copy of an obsolete Russian design. Most agree it was probably a fault with its diesels. The engines either didn't shut down immediately when the submarine submerged, sucking the oxygen out of the hull in minutes, or the suffocating exhaust vented internally rather than outside the hull. Either way, the outcome was catastrophic.
It was one of Communist China's worst peacetime military disasters, and the navy chief and three other senior officers were sacked. But the People's Liberation Army navy was already taking delivery of diesels from MTU. Engineers at the Wuchang Shipyard on the Yangtze River were fitting these power plants in China's first indigenously designed and built conventional submarines, the Song class.
MTU is a unit of Germany's Tognum Group, which is jointly owned by UK-based multinational Rolls Royce Group PLC and Germany's Daimler AG. Contracts with the PLA and powerful defense manufacturers give MTU and its parent influence in competing for contracts in China's massive civilian market. China's biggest arms maker, China North Industries Group Corporation, or Norinco, has been making MTU engines under license since 1986.
In 2010, Tognum opened a joint venture with Norinco to assemble large, high speed MTU diesel engines and emergency generators at a plant in the city of Datong in Shanxi Province. A major goal of the joint venture is to win orders for emergency backup generators for China's expanding roster of nuclear power plants, Tognum said in a press statement. MTU engines are also built under license at the Shaanxi Diesel Engine Heavy Industry Co Ltd, a subsidiary of one of China's two sprawling military and commercial shipbuilders.
Submarine diesel technology is hardly new, but these engines are built to exacting standards to ensure reliability under extreme conditions. MTU has been building them for more than 50 years. The engine delivered to China for the Song and Yuan classes, the MTU 396 SE84 series, is one of the world's most widely used submarine power plants. Each of the Chinese submarines has three MTU diesels, according to technical specifications listed in Chinese military affairs journals and websites.
China's military is reluctant to acknowledge the role of foreign technology in its latest weapons, preferring to recognize the performance of its domestic designers and arms makers. But articles in maritime magazines and naval websites have credited the close relationship between MTU and China's domestic industry for providing the Song class with “the world's most advanced submarine power system.”
In its promotional brochures, MTU says almost 250 of these engines in service with submarines around the world have racked up over 310,000 hours in operation. Some have also been fitted to nuclear submarines as back-up power plants, the company says. MTU also sells different versions of the 396 series for use in locomotives, power generation and mining.
A spokesman for the Federal Office for Economics and Export Control (BAFA), the German authority that has to approve dual-use exports, said exports of diesel engines built especially for military use would be illegal. Engines that can be used for both civilian and military purposes would have to be approved by BAFA, he said - and in the case of China, such dual-use engines “would probably not be approvable.” He declined to comment specifically, however, about the MTU diesel engine sales to China's navy.
Stealthy submarines
Top quality diesel engines like the MTU designs minimize vibration and noise, reducing the risk of detection by enemy sonar. In the hands of a capable crew, modern diesel submarines can be fiendishly difficult to detect. When using their electric motors, they are significantly stealthier than nuclear submarines such as those in service with the United States, naval warfare experts say. For a relatively modest investment, a diesel electric sub could sink a hugely expensive aircraft carrier or surface warship.
With whisper-quiet engines, China's best conventional submarines armed with modern torpedoes and missiles may pose the biggest danger to any potential adversary - including the U.S. Navy. Beijing's naval strategists are banking on their growing fleet of subs to keep the Americans and their allies far away from strategic flashpoints in the event of conflict, such as Taiwan or disputed territories in the East China Sea and South China Sea.
That means the Pentagon's favored method of modern warfare - parking carriers near the coast of an enemy and conducting massive air strikes - would be very risky in any clash with China.
The PLA navy has already demonstrated this capability. In 2006, a Song class submarine shocked the U.S. Navy when it surfaced about five miles from the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, well within torpedo range, in waters off the Japanese island of Okinawa. The Chinese boat had been undetected while it was apparently shadowing the U.S. carrier and its escorts, U.S. officials later confirmed.
PLA submarines are becoming much more active. Recorded Chinese submarine patrols increased steadily from four in 2001 to 18 in 2011, according to U.S Naval Intelligence data supplied in response to freedom of information requests from a Federation of American Scientists researcher, Hans M. Kristensen.
A senior U.S. Navy official declined to comment on German delivery of diesel engines to China, but said the United States is well aware of the challenges such submarines pose. “Diesel engines are notoriously difficult to detect, but we are also always investing in improving own capabilities to make our submarines quieter,” the official said.
source:
https://www.voanews.com/a/chinese-military-secret-to-success-european-engineering/1814104.html
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May 16, 2021 Topic: Chinese Submarines Region: Asia Blog Brand: The Reboot Tags: SubmarineAccidentNavyPLAPLANMilitaryTechnology
An Entire Chinese Submarine Crew Suffocated To Death
The entire crew suffocated to death at their posts.
by Sebastien Roblin
Here's What You Need to Remember: The Chinese government is not disposed to transparency regarding its military accidents. For example, it does not release the results of its investigations into jet fighter crashes and it never publicly acknowledged earlier submarine accidents. At the time, some commentators expressed surprise that Beijing acknowledged the incident at all, and speculated it was obliquely related to contemporaneous criticism of Beijing’s attempts to downplay the SARS epidemic.
On April 25, 2003, the crew of a Chinese fishing boat noticed a strange sight—a periscope drifting listlessly above the surface of the water. The fishermen notified the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) which promptly dispatched two vessels to investigate.
At first, the PLAN believed the contact to be an intruding submarine from South Korea or Japan. But when Chinese personnel finally recovered the apparent derelict they realized it was one of their own diesel-electric submarines, the Ming-class 361.
When they boarded on April 26, they found all seventy personnel slumped dead at their stations.
Military commissioner and former president Jiang Zemin acknowledged the tragic incident on May 2, 2003, in a statement honoring the sacrifice of Chinese sailors' lives and vaguely characterizing the cause as “mechanical failure.”
A month later, an inquiry by his commission resulted in the dismissal of both the commander and commissar of the North Sea Fleet, and the demotion or dismissal of six or eight more officers for “improper command and control.” Jiang and President Hu Jintao later reportedly visited the recovered submarine and met with the families of the deceased.
The Chinese government is not disposed to transparency regarding its military accidents. For example, it does not release the results of its investigations into jet fighter crashes and it never publicly acknowledged earlier submarine accidents. At the time, some commentators expressed surprise that Beijing acknowledged the incident at all, and speculated it was obliquely related to contemporaneous criticism of Beijing’s attempts to downplay the SARS epidemic.
The Type 035 Ming-class submarine was an outdated second-generation design evolved from the lineage of the Soviet Romeo-class, in turn a Soviet development of the German Type XXI “Electric U-Boat” from World War II. The first two Type 035s were built in 1975 but remained easy to detect compared to contemporary American or Russian designs. Though China operated numerous diesel submarines, due to concerns over seaworthiness, they rarely ventured far beyond coastal waters in that era.
Nonetheless, Chinese shipyards continued to build updated Ming-class boats well into the 1990s. Submarine 361 was one of the later Type 035G Ming III models, which introduced the capability to engage opposing submerged submarines with guided torpedoes. Entering service in 1995, she and three sister ships numbered 359 through 362 formed the North Sea Fleet’s 12th Submarine Brigade based in Liaoning province. You can see them together in this photo.
361 had been deployed on a naval exercise in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea gulf east of Beijing and Tianjing. Unusually, a senior naval officer, Commodore Cheng Fuming was aboard. In its last ship’s log on April 16, the submarine was practicing silent running while off the Changshang island, heading back to a base in Weihai, Shandong Province.
Because it was maintaining radio silence, the PLAN didn’t realize anything was amiss until ten days later. The method by which 361 was recovered after its presence was reported remains unclear. Several accounts imply the ship was submerged, but the fact that it was promptly towed back to port implies that it had surfaced.
The lack of a clear official explanation has led to various theories over the years. The typical complement of a Type 035 submarine is fifty-five to fifty-seven personnel, but 361 had seventy on board. Officially these were trainers, but conditions would have been quite cramped. The presence of the additional personnel and the high-ranking Commodore Cheng leads to the general conclusion that 361 was not on a routine mission.
Indeed, some commentators speculated that the additional crew was observing tests of an experimental Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system which would have offered greater stealth and underwater endurance. As it happens, another Type 035G submarine, 308, was used to test an AIP drive, and Stirling AIP drives would soon equip the prolific Type 041 Yuan-class submarines which prowl the seas today.
Another theory is that leaks allowed seawater to mix with battery acid, forming deadly chlorine gas that poisoned the crew. The Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily claimed the submarine had embarked on a “dangerous” antisubmarine training, and that “human error” led it to nose-down uncontrollably, causing it to get stuck on the seafloor.
However, the most widely accepted explanation today was first published by the Hong Kong Wen Wei Po, a pro-Beijing newspaper: the crew was suffocated by the sub’s diesel engine.
A conventional diesel-electric submarine uses an air-breathing diesel engine to charge up its batteries for underwater propulsion. This is usually done while surfaced—but a submarine attempting to remain undetected can also cruise submerged just below the surface and use a snorkel to sip air. The snorkel is designed to automatically seal up if the water level gets too high.
According to Wen Wei Po, 361 was running its diesel while snorkeling when high water caused the air intake valve to close—or the valve failed to open properly due to a malfunction. However, its diesel engine did not shut down as it should have in response. You can find what appears to be a translated version of the article here.
Apparently, the motor consumed most of the submarine’s air supply in just two minutes. The crew might have felt light-headed and short of breath during the first minute and would have begun losing consciousness in the second. The negative air pressure also made it impossible to open the hatches. A 2013 article by Reuters repeats this theory as well as mentioning the possibility that was exhaust was improperly vented back into the hull to fatal effect.
Any of these explanations would reflect serious failings in both crew training and mechanical performance.
The recent tragic loss of the Argentine submarine San Juan, the fire raging amongst moored Russian Kilo-class submarines at Vladivostok (a drill, Moscow claims), and the fortunately nonfatal but highly expensive flooding of the Indian nuclear-powered submarine Arihant highlight that despite being arguably the most fearsome weapon system on the planet, submarines remain dangerous to operate even when not engaged in a war. Even brief breakdowns in crew discipline or mechanical reliability can rapidly turn the stealthy underwater marauders into watery coffins.
Only high standards of maintenance, manufacturing, and crew training can avert lethal peacetime disasters—standards which are difficult for many nations to afford, but which the PLA Navy likely aspires to it as it continues to expand and professionalize its forces at an extraordinary rate.
Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier and is being reposted due to reader interest.
source:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/entire-chinese-submarine-crew-suffocated-death-185305
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October 26, 2019
Topic: Security
Tags: ChinaRussiaHistoryWorldSubmarineNavy
How an Entire Chinese Submarine Crew Died: They Suffocated to Death
This is no way to die.
by Sebastien Roblin
Key point: Attaining high standards for maintenance and crew training is difficult for any navy.
On April 25, 2003 the crew of a Chinese fishing boat noticed a strange sight—a periscope drifting listlessly above the surface of the water. The fishermen notified the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) which promptly dispatched two vessels to investigate.
At first, the PLAN believed the contact to be an intruding submarine from South Korea or Japan. But when Chinese personnel finally recovered the apparent derelict they realized it was one of their own diesel-electric submarines, the Ming-class 361.
When they boarded on April 26, they found all seventy personnel slumped dead at their stations.
Military commissioner and former president Jiang Zemin acknowledged the tragic incident on May 2, 2003, in a statement honoring the sacrifice of Chinese sailors lives and vaguely characterizing the cause as “mechanical failure.”
A month later, an inquiry by his commission resulted in the dismissal of both the commander and commissar of the North Sea Fleet, and the demotion or dismissal of six or eight more officers for “improper command and control.” Jiang and President Hu Jintao later reportedly visited the recovered submarine and met with the families of the deceased.
The Chinese government is not disposed to transparency regarding its military accidents. For example, it does not release the results of its investigations into jet fighter crashes and it never publicly acknowledged earlier submarine accidents. At the time, some commentators expressed surprise that Beijing acknowledged the incident at all, and speculated it was obliquely related to contemporaneous criticism of Beijing’s attempts to downplay the SARS epidemic.
The Type 035 Ming-class submarine was an outdated second-generation design evolved from the lineage of the Soviet Romeo-class, in turn a Soviet development of the German Type XXI “Electric U-Boat” from World War II. The first two Type 035s were built in 1975 but remained easy to detect compared to contemporary American or Russian designs. Though China operated numerous diesel submarines, due to concerns over seaworthiness, they rarely ventured far beyond coastal waters in that era.
Nonetheless, Chinese shipyards continued to build updated Ming-class boats well into the 1990s. Submarine 361 was one of the later Type 035G Ming III models, which introduced the capability to engage opposing submerged submarines with guided torpedoes. Entering service in 1995, she and three sister ships numbered 359 through 362 formed the North Sea Fleet’s 12th Submarine Brigade based in Liaoning province. You can see them together in this photo.
361 had been deployed on a naval exercise in the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea gulf east of Beijing and Tianjing. Unusually, a senior naval officer, Commodore Cheng Fuming was aboard. In its last ship’s log on April 16, the submarine was practicing silent running while off the Changshang island, heading back to a base in Weihai, Shandong Province.
Because it was maintaining radio silence, the PLAN didn’t realize anything was amiss until ten days later. The method by which 361 was recovered after its presence was reported remains unclear. Several accounts imply the ship was submerged, but the fact that it was promptly towed back to port implies that it had surfaced.
The lack of clear official explanation has led to various theories over the years. The typical complement of a Type 035 submarine is fifty-five to fifty-seven personnel, but 361 had seventy on board. Officially these were trainers, but conditions would have been quite cramped. The presence of the additional personnel and the high-ranking Commodore Cheng leads to the general conclusion that 361 was not on a routine mission.
Indeed, some commentators speculated that the additional crew were observing tests of an experimental Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system which would have offered greater stealth and underwater endurance. As it happens, another Type 035G submarine, 308, was used to test an AIP drive, and Stirling AIP drives would soon equip the prolific Type 041 Yuan-class submarines which prowl the seas today.
Another theory is that leaks allowed seawater to mix with battery acid, forming deadly chlorine gas that poisoned the crew. The Hong Kong Sing Tao Daily claimed the submarine had embarked on a “dangerous” antisubmarine training, and that “human error” led it to nose-down uncontrollably, causing it to get stuck on the seafloor.
However, the most widely accepted explanation today was first published by the Hong Kong Wen Wei Po, a pro-Beijing newspaper: the crew was suffocated by the sub’s diesel engine.
A conventional diesel electric submarine uses an air-breathing diesel engine to charge up its batteries for underwater propulsion. This is usually done while surfaced—but a submarine attempting to remain undetected can also cruise submerged just below the surface and use a snorkel to sip air. The snorkel is designed to automatically seal up if the water level gets too high.
According to Wen Wei Po, 361 was running its diesel while snorkeling when high water caused the air intake valve to close—or the valve failed to open properly due to a malfunction. However, its diesel engine did not shut down as it should have in response. You can find what appears to be a translated version of the article here.
Apparently, the motor consumed most of the submarine’s air supply in just two minutes. The crew might have felt light headed and short of breath during the first minute, and would have begun losing consciousness in the second. The negative air pressure also made it impossible to open the hatches. A 2013 article by Reuters repeats this theory as well as mentioning the possibility that was exhaust was improperly vented back into the hull to fatal effect.
Any of these explanations would reflect serious failings in both crew training and mechanical performance.
The recent tragic loss of the Argentine submarine San Juan, the fire raging amongst moored Russian Kilo-class submarines at Vladivostok (a drill, Moscow claims), and the fortunately nonfatal but highly expensive flooding of the Indian nuclear-powered submarine Arihant highlight that despite being arguably the most fearsome weapon system on the planet, submarines remain dangerous to operate even when not engaged in a war. Even brief breakdowns in crew discipline or mechanical reliability can rapidly turn the stealthy underwater marauders into watery coffins.
Only high standards of maintenance, manufacturing and crew training can avert lethal peacetime disasters—standards which are difficult for many nations to afford, but which the PLA Navy likely aspires to it as it continues to expand and professionalize its forces at an extraordinary rate.
Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This article first appeared last year.
source:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/how-entire-chinese-submarine-crew-died-they-suffocated-death-90561
source:
why don't we run out of oxygen?
https://www.quora.com/Why-dont-we-run-out-of-oxygen?share=1
https://www.quora.com/Why-dont-we-run-out-of-oxygen?
John Jones
Former STS1(SS) at US Navy Submarine Force (1979–1988)Author has 344 answers and 3.6M answer views3y
Related
How do you run out of oxygen on a submarine?
The Chinese are the only ones to do it in the modern era that we know of. In 2003, a Ming III class DE Submarine lost its entire crew when a diesel failed to shut down correctly, and the crew had all hatches and the snorkel mast down before verifying the diesel was secured. Only the periscope was up.
The diesel sucked all the oxygen from the pressure hull, killing the crew so fast they were all found at their watchstations. It drifted for 10 days, until its Periscope was seen by fisherman and reported to the Chinese military.
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USS Thresher (SSN-593)
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For other ships with the same name, see USS Thresher.
USS Thresher (SSN-593) underway, 30 April 1961
USS Thresher (SSN-593) under way, 30 April 1961
History
United States
Name Thresher
Namesake Thresher shark
Ordered 15 January 1958
Builder Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Laid down 28 May 1958
Launched 9 July 1960
Commissioned 3 August 1961
Motto Vis Tacita (Silent Strength)
Fate Lost with all hands during deep diving tests, 10 April 1963; 129 died.
General characteristics
Class and type Permit-class submarine
Displacement 3,540 short tons (3,210 t) light, 3,770 short tons (3,420 t) submerged
Length 279 ft (85 m)
Beam 32 ft (9.8 m)
Draft 26 ft (7.9 m)
Propulsion 1 Westinghouse S5W PWR, Westinghouse Geared Turbines 15,000 shp (11 MW)
Speed 33 knots (61 km/h; 38 mph)
Complement 16 officers, 96 men
Armament 4 × 21 in (530 mm) torpedo tubes amidships
USS Thresher (SSN-593) was the lead boat of her class of nuclear-powered attack submarines in the United States Navy. She was the U.S. Navy's second submarine to be named after the thresher shark.
On 10 April 1963, Thresher sank during deep-diving tests about 350 km (220 mi) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, killing all 129 crew and shipyard personnel aboard. It is the second-deadliest submarine incident on record, after the 1942 loss of the French submarine Surcouf, in which 130 crew died.[1][2] Her loss was a watershed for the U.S. Navy, leading to the implementation of a rigorous submarine safety program known as SUBSAFE. The first nuclear submarine lost at sea, Thresher was also the third of four submarines lost with more than 100 people aboard, the others being Argonaut, lost with 102 aboard in 1943, Surcouf sinking with 130 personnel in 1942, and Kursk, which sank with 118 aboard in 2000.
source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Thresher_(SSN-593)
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_lost_Russian_or_Soviet_submarines
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_lost_United_States_submarines
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Soviet submarine K-278 Komsomolets
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article includes a list of general references, but it lacks sufficient corresponding inline citations. Please help to improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (April 2011) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)
Mike class SSN.svg
K-278 Komsomolets profile
K-278 underway in 1986
K-278 upon deployment on 1 January in 1986.
History
Soviet naval pennantSoviet Union
Name
K-278 (1983–1988)
K-278 Komsomolets (1988–1989)
Builder Sevmash
Yard number 510
Laid down 22 April 1978
Launched 9 May 1983 (3 June 1983)
Commissioned 28 December 1983
Decommissioned 6 June 1990
Homeport Bolshaya Lopatka at Zapadnaya Litsa
Fate Sank due to fire on 7 April 1989, killing 42
Notes Located in the Barents Sea in 1,700 m (5,600 ft) of water
General characteristics
Class and type NATO reporting name "Mike"-class submarine
Displacement 4,400–5,750 tons surfaced, 6,400–8,000 tons submerged
Length 117.5 m (385 ft)
Beam 10.7 m (35 ft)
Draft 8 to 9 m (26 to 30 ft)
Propulsion One 190 MW OK-650 b-3 PWR (HEU <= 45%[1]), two 45000 shp steam turbines, one shaft
Speed 14 knots (26 km/h; 16 mph) surfaced, 26 to 30 knots (48 to 56 km/h; 30 to 35 mph) submerged
Test depth 1,000 m safe, 1,250 m design, 1,500 m crush
Complement 30 officers, 22 warrant officers, 12 petty officers and enlisted
Armament
SS-N-15 Starfish anti-submarine missiles
6 x 533 mm (21-inch) torpedo tubes for 53-65 torpedo and VA-111 Shkval torpedoes
The K-278 Komsomolets was the Project-685 Plavnik (Russian: проект-685 плавник, meaning "fin", also known by her NATO reporting name of "Mike"-class), nuclear-powered attack submarine of the Soviet Navy; the only submarine of her design class.
In the inventory of the Soviet military, K-278 was unique for her submarine depth rating, having reached a depth of 1,020 metres (3,350 feet) in the Norwegian Sea on 4 August 1984.[2] Although K-278 was commissioned in the Soviet Navy to evaluate the technology for the fourth-generation of Russian nuclear submarines, she was capable of combat maneuvering and deployment. During her third operational patrol in the Arctic Ocean in 1989, a serious fire in the aft compartments led to her sinking in the Barents Sea off the coast of Norway.[3]
Despite the fire in the engineering compartment, K-278 was able to surface and remained afloat for approximately five hours before sinking.[4] Many of the crew perished before rescue, leading to 42 total dead.
The wrecked submarine is on the floor of the Barents Sea, about 1.7 km (1 mile) deep, with her nuclear reactor and two nuclear warhead-armed torpedoes still on board.
source:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_submarine_K-278_Komsomolets
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